

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

4 FEB 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

**SUBJECT: Recapitulation of and Comment on Discussions of  
New Systems**

Discussions of candidate systems, after you left the meeting of 2 February, brought out what will probably be the initial arguments to be used against our proposals. These are paraphrased in the next four paragraphs.

Requirements, formal: USIB has not set any requirement for quick reaction or crisis management. NRO is responsive to and only to collection requirements established by USIB. Quick reaction and crisis management are simply desires expressed by the Secretary of Defense. (Reply: this is a matter for the DCI to discuss with the Secretary of Defense)

Requirements, technical: It is not evident that building one system to meet several different requirements, each in a somewhat compromised way, is desirable. (Reply: this cannot be decided in abstracto: one must evaluate the extent of the compromises)

Cost: TITAN IIIX/AGENA will cost \$2.5 million more per launch than a TITAN II. If one launched 40 systems for normal search and surveillance, the extra \$100 million might better be used to develop a separate system optimized for quick reaction and for flexibility, rather than regularly using the TITAN IIIX/AGENA on missions which do not require its extra capabilities. (Observation: this is really just a specific version of the generalized argument immediately above; it is commented on later)

Development time: FULCRUM can fly in two years. Neither ITEK nor Eastman has progressed anything like this far. (Observation: the documentation on FULCRUM will undoubtedly defend this claim; the central issue is another one, however - that of development risk)

FULCRUM

EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION  
DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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If DoD holds firmly to its adoption of the TITAN IIIIX as a standard space booster, the cost issue will ultimately vanish. It is somewhat specious at best, because the additional unit cost, which may not be as high as \$2.5 million, buys many kinds of flexibility in addition to that used to fly on special orbits; for example, the ability to use measures to dodge attack.

The real issues bearing on the selection process are:

1. Flexibility, and the question whether valid DoD requirements for quick reaction and other than routine search missions are to be recognized;
2. Development risk and the risk - very real in the case of FULCRUM - that one might never get a system which reliably operates at its performance goals.

Other equally real issues, which do not logically bear on the selection process but obviously will influence the discussions, involve the roles and responsibilities of the CIA versus the NRO, and the fundamental question whether the CIA should undertake a development without regard to NRO analysis or to DoD requirements.

I have prepared a memorandum to Mr. McNamara outlining the present state of affairs and giving some background bearing on these two central issues. His copy is attached, signed, for your transmittal to him if you feel that it is appropriate.

Explicit in the attached memorandum is the principle that Mr. McNamara needs a comparative analysis by the NRO of the candidate systems. Your letter to Mr. McCone of 8 July 1964 committed me to such an analysis. I urge that we adhere steadfastly to this principle. Any attempt to get a valid analysis, or basis of analysis, agreed upon with the CIA will stall in infinite negotiations.

Certain specific actions are required soon:

- a. General Carroll must present to USIB a statement of DoD collection requirements that adequately reflects the concern of Mr. McNamara and the JCS for quick reaction and crisis management. The time is ripe because USIB has asked its members to comment on a COMOR "requirements" paper. I will undertake to discuss this matter with General Carroll.

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b. Request from Mr. McCone detailed information on FULCRUM. I am preparing a catalog of what we need for analysis.

c. Practically, I believe we must be prepared to reciprocate by providing CIA with data on the Eastman and ITEK systems. I am setting up a mechanism to insure that we release data only after we have analysed it and have established our own judgment of it.

d. We have started Eastman on a dynamical test of their allegedly critical item - the oscillating mirror and its coupling to the film drive. It is appropriate to consider expanding their effort into several aspects of preliminary design. I think one could undertake a useful amount before being accused of preempting a decision - particularly in view of the fact that we have agreed to spend \$610K on further development of the FULCRUM camera. I would like your guidance.

e. I will give you shortly a rough preliminary comparison of the candidate systems, including FULCRUM.

Consideration must be given to a sixth action: notify Mr. McCone officially that there will not be a TITAN II space booster. I do not favor doing this now. It is not now an action required to protect TITAN III. Whenever it is done, it will appear as an arbitrary limitation on the CIA planning. We should take time to identify and evaluate all the consequences of the commitment of FULCRUM to TITAN II before making an official decision on the matter.

Signed

Brockway McMillan

Attachment

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